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STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND SECTION 1983:
IMPLICATIONS FOR ILLINOIS CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW
BY:

BRIAN KIBBLE-SMITH*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Acts provide individuals
with the means to seek compensation for the illegal deprivation of
constitutionally-guaranteed rights and to safeguard those rights
from future interference. In particular, the Act' of 1871 ("Section
1983") is designed to prohibit the deprivation of constitutional
rights "under color of law." Such deprivation takes many forms including physical attack, employment discrimination, destruction of
property, and interference with contracts and relationships, to name
a few.
Section 1983 does not contain a limitation period. It is therefore
a standard practice for federal courts to adopt a limitation period
for Section 1983 suits from other federal and state laws controlling
statutory and common law causes. In Wilson v.Garcia,2 the Supreme Court attempted to bring uniformity to the process of selecting an appropriate limitation, a process that has yielded confusing
results both among and within the federal circuits. Under Wilson,
courts in all states are now directed to refer to state personal injury
law for the limitation periods applicable to civil rights actions.'
What seemed to be a clear Court mandate has, however, produced
conflicting results as Illinois federal district courts grope to properly
apply the Wilson guidelines.' Close examination of the policies underlying Wilson, together with the historical interpretation of state
limitation periods, indicates that a literal application of Wilson is
contrary to the purpose and intent of Illinois limitation laws. Illinois
district courts must read beyond the surface of the Wilson opinion
to discern and implement the policies underlying the decision and
* B.G.S., University of Michigan-Flint; J.D., IIT/Chicago Kent College of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (hereinafter "the Act," or "Section 1983"].
2. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
3. Id. at 280.
4. Wegrzyn v. Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Services, 627 F. Supp. 636 (C.D.
Ill. 1986); Johnson v. Arnos, 624 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Moore v. Floro, 614 F.
Supp. 328 (N.D. I1. 1985); West v. County of Will., No. 84 C 7540, slip op. at 3 (N.D.
Ill.
June 6, 1985); Winston v. Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176 (C.D. I1. 1985).
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implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court.
II. Section 1983 and Limitation Periods
Section 1983 was enacted to enforce Section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. The Act was modeled after Section 2 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,6 and was intended to "enforce the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, and for other Purposes."'7 Section 1983 allows plaintiffs to
seek both injunctive and compensatory relief.8 The Supreme Court
has interpreted it as providing an opportunity for private citizens to
assert a federal remedy "against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon the rights secured by the Constitution and
laws of the Nation."9 The "incursions" which Section 1983 is
designed to remedy include violations of fourteenth amendment
rights through the passage of unconstitutional laws, violation of certain federal statutes and illegal activity "under color of state law"10
that deprives plaintiffs of rights recognized under the Constitution."
The authority of courts to refer to other laws for Section 1983
limitations is based upon 42 U.S.C. Section 198812 ("Section 1988").
5. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). Section 5 provides Congress with
the authority to enforce the fourteenth amendment "[b]y appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
6. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162-63 (1970).
7. 17 Stat. 13. See generally NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIsERTIEs LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 (1979) [hereinafter NAHMOD I].
8. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
9. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). The Foster Court characterized the
role of Section 1983 as "interpos[ing] the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the peoples' Federal rights .... Id,at 242.
10. Section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
11. Recently, the Supreme Court broadly described the purpose of 1983. The
Court noted that as a result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil
War era, especially the fourteenth amendment, which was its centerpiece, the role of
the federal government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was
clearly established. Foster, 407 U.S. at 239. Section 1983 opened the federal courts to
private citizens, offering a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the
claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of
the Nation." Id. "The very purpose of Section 1983 was to interpose the federal
courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights
- to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law,
'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.'" Id. at 242.
12. Section 1988 provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons
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Congress has implicitly endorsed this approach in civil rights cases.' s
Section 1988 requires courts to select a limitations period that is
consistent with federal law."' Section 1988 also directs district courts
to enforce the Civil Rights Act "in conformity with the laws of the
United States so far as such laws are suitable" to give effect to the
V
purposes of Section 1983.
5 In Burnett v. Grattan," the Supreme
Court interpreted these directions as creating a three step
7
approach.1
The first step is to examine federal law for a limitation period
applicable to the claim. The second step, if there is no appropriate
federal choice,' 8 is to consider relevant state law "as modified and
changed by the Constitution of the United States."' The third step
is to assure the predominance of federal interest. With this in mind,
the Burnett Court admonished lower courts that state law is to be
applied only if it is not "inconsistent with the laws of the United
States." 0
For many years, federal courts emphasized selecting a limitation
period through substantive characterization of the suit in such a way
that the applicable state statute of limitation could be identified by
analogy.2 This philosophy resulted in varying approaches, frequently dependent upon what federal consideration the deciding
court deemed relevant.2 Although some Supreme Court guidance
was available prior to Wilson,"3 procedures for selecting a limitation
in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be
exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far
as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where
they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law,
as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the
same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of
the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on
the party found guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
13. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 267.
14. Id. at 268.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.
16. 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
17. Id. at 48.
18. The second step, to resort to state law, "should not be undertaken before
[all] principles of federal law are exhausted." Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268.
19. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)).
20. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 24-48. See also NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 § 4.13 (Supp. 1985)

[hereinafter NAHMOD II].
21. See infra text accompanying notes 24-48. See also NAHMOD II, supra note

20.
22. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643 (10th Cir. 1984).
23. See, e.g., Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48; Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S.
478 (1980); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express
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period among the circuits, and even within individual circuits,
varied.
A.

Factual Analogies Prior to Wilson

The First Circuit, for example, issued a series of conflicting
opinions, beginning with Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de
Choudens.2 4 Ramirez analogized a Section 1983 claim alleging the
unconstitutional termination of public employment to a general tort.
The Ramirez court then applied the Puerto Rican limitation statute
appropriate for a general tort action. A later First Circuit case,
Gashgai v. Leibowitz," selected without discussion the Maine statute that applied to various specific torts. Subsequently, the First
Circuit in Walden, III, Inc.,26 refused to analogize a civil rights
claim to specific torts. Another more recent case claimed to follow
the analogy to tort law, but seemed to subordinate its analysis to a
desire to keep personnel disputes out of federal court."'
Similar confusion existed in the Third Circuit, where opinions
characterized claims by their "essential nature. ' 29 Courts in that circuit faithfully analogized claims to factually comparable state law
claims, and then selected an appropriate limitation."0 This method
was extended to absurdity, however, as different limitations were
applied to different parts of the Section 1983 claim."
The Fifth Circuit developed two lines of limitation cases. The
first line followed the two-step process of characterizing the offense
by factual analogy to state law as a means of selecting the appropriate limitation period.32 The second line took a more direct approach.
The Fifth Circuit courts following this method avoided the factual
characterization step by determining which limitation period the
state itself would apply if the plaintiff brought a suit in state court
seeking similar relief." Presumably, this approach preserved the
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975); O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
24. 575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1978).
25. 703 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1983).
26. 576 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1978).
27. The Walden court, anticipating Wilson in part, stated that it was "obviously preferable that one statute of limitations ...apply generally to most if not all
of Section 1983 actions arising in a particular jurisdiction." Id. at 947.
28. Burns v. Sullivan, 619 F.2d 99, 107 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 893
(1981).
29. Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n., 559 F.2d 894, 900 (3d
Cir. 1977); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96 (3rd Cir. 1974).
30. See, e.g., Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 581 F.2d 335 (3rd Cir. 1978);
Meyers, 559 F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1977); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir. 1974).
31. Polite, 507 F.2d at 123-24.
32. See Shay v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1976).
33. Id. at 1292. See also Morell v. City of Picayune, 690 F.2d 469 (5th Cir.
1982); White v. United Parcel Service, 692 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1982); Lavelle v. Listi, 611
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flexibility to characterize a claim by analogy to state law, s4 as a right
arising under statute,"5 or by referring to a "catch-all" statute of

limitation. 6
The Sixth Circuit's approach apparently varied according to the
statutes of limitation that were available.17 For example, the court in
an employment discrimination suit applied the Michigan limitation
period covering personal injuries.8 Subsequent employment discrimination suits, however, were heard under the period applying to
actions on rights created by statute. 9 In later cases, the Sixth Circuit refused to characterize suits as claims based on statutory rights
and instead derived limitations from statutes controlling factually
similar torts.40
Other circuits also employed varying factual analogical methods
in determining limitation periods. The Eighth Circuit which appeared to follow the analogical approach, but recently reconciled two
inconsistent lines of cases in Garmon v. Foust."' The Garmon court
rejected the tort analogy in favor of a "rights under statute" characterization."2 The Tenth Circuit variously characterized Section 1983

suits according to their underlying facts,'4 as contractual" and noncontractual 6 injuries to the rights of another, and as liability based
upon statute.'6 The Eleventh Circuit generally followed the approach of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, drawing heavily upon state
law and available statutes. 7 The District of Columbia Circuit also

endorsed this method.' 8

F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1980).
34. Morrell, 690 F.2d at 469.
35. See, e.g., Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 907 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
36. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
37. See Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue: The Civil Rights Dilemma, 33
DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1983-84).
38. Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1969).
39. Mason v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 517 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1975).
40. See, e.g., Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1982);
Carmicle v. Weddle, 555 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1977).
41. 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982).
42. Id. at 406.
43. See, e.g., Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1983); Shah v. Halliburton Co., 627 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1980); Zuniga v. Amfac Foods, Inc., 580 F.2d 380
(10th Cir. 1978).
44. Hansbury v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 596 F.2d 944, 949 n.15 (10th
Cir. 1979).
45. Garcia v. Univ. of Kansas, 702 F.2d 849, 850-51 (10th Cir. 1983).
46. Spiegel v. School Dist. No. 1 Laramie County, 600 F.2d 264, 265-66 (10th
Cir. 1979).
47. See, e.g., McGhee v. Ogburn, 707 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1983); Bonner v. City
of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
48. McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366, 371-73 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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B. Rights Arising Under Statutes
The Second, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits regarded Section 1983 claims as liability based upon statutory rights.49 The Seventh Circuit opinion in Beard v. Robinson"0 summarizes the reasoning for this position. In Beard, an FBI informant murdered Jeff
Beard, on whose behalf a claim was filed under Section 1983.51 The
Beard court held that a civil rights claim could not be equated with
a common law tort.2 The Seventh Circuit instead chose to characterize the action as one based upon a statutory right. Because Illinois law provided no limitation period applicable to suits for rights
based on statutes, the Beard court selected the five-year limitation
period for "actions not otherwise provided for" in Illinois limitation
laws. s Beard, therefore, became the basis for the limitation period
applied to Section 1983 suits in Illinois.
Historically, the principle dispute in selecting the appropriate
statute of limitation was whether to reach a general characterization
of the civil rights claim, or to examine the facts underlying the specific case to find an appropriate limitation period for a comparable
state law action. Where the decision was made to reach a general
characterization, the rights under statute approach was both a popular and seemingly logical choice. 4 It was against this background of
patchwork decisions and approaches that the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Wilson. The Wilson Court endorsed the general
49. See, e.g., Pauk v. Board of Trustees of City University of N.Y., 654 F.2d
856, 866 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Beard, 563 F.2d at 336-37
(7th Cir. 1977); Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels, 656 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1981).
50. 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
51. Id. at 332.
52. Id. at 336-37. Stating that "the Civil Rights Acts do not create a body of
general federal tort law," the Beard court quoted with approval from Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The Justice wrote in that
concurrence with regard to the Civil Rights Act that "a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state
right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitutional right." Id. at 184. In
contrast, the Tenth Circuit in its Garcia opinion focused upon the elements of the
cause of action, not the nature of the remedy, in reaching a contrary conclusion. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 651. An important factor in that court's likening of Section 1983
claims to personal injury actions was that Section 1983, in and of itself, creates no
new substantive rights. Id. at 650. See also infra text accompanying notes 72-73.
53. Beard, 563 F.2d at 336, 338. In selecting the five-year catch-all limitation
contained in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-205 (1983) [hereinafter "five-year statute"],
the Seventh Circuit overruled Jones v. Jones, 410 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970), which had endorsed the two-year limitation period, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-202 (1983) [hereinafter "two-year statute"], for application to
suits under Section 1983. Jones selected a statute that applied to suits for "injur[ies]
to the person, false imprisonment, and abduction." Id.
54. The Eighth Circuit, for example, rejected the tort analogy approach because
it "unduly cramp[ed] the significance of Section 1983 as a broad, statutory remedy."
Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2283 (1982).
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characterization approach and directed federal courts to select limitation periods by referring to state personal injury law."
III. The Wilson Case
On April 27, 1979, a New Mexico state police officer allegedly
beat Gary Garcia and sprayed him with teargas." Garcia sued in the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico under
Section 1983. Garcia filed his claim two years and nine months after
the accrual of his cause of action. The defendants moved to dismiss
on the ground that the statute of limitations barred Garcia's claim.
The motion to dismiss was based upon a New Mexico Supreme
Court decision that held the New Mexico Tort Claims Act 57 to be
the "most closely analogous state cause of action"" to a Section
1983 claim. Therefore, the defendants argued, the two-year New
Mexico statute of limitations applicable to claims under that act
barred the claim." Two other New Mexico statutes could have applied, however. First, New Mexico provides a three-year limitation
for suits based on "an injury to the person or reputation of any person."6' Second, there is a four-year limitation for "all actions not
.. . otherwise provided for."61
The district court held that the state supreme court's decision
would not control the selection of a limitation period because a Section 1983 claim should be characterized by federal law, not state
law. 2 The court based this choice on a characterization of the plaintiff's claim as one for rights arising under statute. The court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss. 3
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed both the
district court's ruling that Section 1983 claims were to be characterized by federal law, and the denial of the motion to dismiss."
The court chose, however, to classify Section 1983 claims as suits
for personal injuries. Hence, the Tenth Circuit held that the threeyear New Mexico limitation period" for personal injury suits applied to plaintiffs. In selecting the general characterization approach, the Tenth Circuit expressly rejected the lines of cases that
55. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 276.
56. Id. at 1940.
57. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (1978).

58. DeVargas v. New Mexico, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
59.

Wilson, 471 U.S. at 263.

62.

Wilson, 471 U.S. at 264.

60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978).
61. Id. § 37-1-4.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. N.M.

STAT.

ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978).
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characterized Section 1983 claims as suits for rights under statutes. 6"
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit. 7 The Court
stressed the particular need for clear rules in the area of statutes of
limitation." The majority emphasized the importance and primacy
of the federal interest under Section 1988," and supported the
70
Tenth Circuit's rejection of the state supreme court precedent.
The court then discussed the practical considerations underlying a
broad characterization of Section 1983 claims."
The Court agreed with the Tenth Circuit's characterization of
Section 1983 claims as analogous to personal injury actions." In discussing the origins of the Civil Rights Act as Congress' attempt to
"restore peace and justice" to the turbulent post-Civil War South,73
the Court maintained that the problems giving rise to the Civil
Rights Act "plainly sounded in tort," but acknowledged that Section
1983 encompasses a range of remedies for offenses far beyond the
scope of tort law.74 The Court specifically criticized the "rights
under statute" characterization of Section 1983 claims that led to
the frequent application
of catch-all limitation periods for lack of a
75
better solution.

The central objection in Justice O'Connor's dissent was her
view that the majority had abandoned the policies of section 1988.76
She pointed out the long and successful history of referring to state
77
law for limitation periods where Congress had remained silent.
Justice O'Connor stressed the importance of relying upon a state's
judgment, expressed in its limitation period, of what is a reasonable
78
time in which to bring suits for varying injuries.
Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for failing to adequately explain why a Section 1983 claim is dissimilar to a factually
66. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 650 (10th Cir. 1984).
67. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of the case. Wilson, 472
U.S. at 280. Justice O'Connor filed the lone dissent.
68. Id. at 1942. The Court quoted from Chardon v. Fumero, 462 U.S. 650, 667
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting): "Few areas of the law stand in greater need of
firmly defined, easily applied rules than does the subject of periods of limitation."
69. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-71.
70. Id. at 271.
71. Id. at 272.
72. Id. at 273.
73. Id. at 277.

74. Id. at 278.
75. "The relative scarcity of statutory claims when Section 1983 was enacted
makes it unlikely that Congress would have intended to apply the catch-all periods of
limitations for statutory claims that were later enacted by many states." Id.
76. Id. at 1949 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

77. Id. at 1950.

78. "In borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a federal cause

of action, a federal court is relying on the state's wisdom in setting a limit ... on the
prosecution of a closely analogous claim." Id. (citations omitted).
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analogous state claim."' Instead, the Court relied upon "[g]roping to
discern what the 42nd Congress would have done" were it confronted with the limitation issue before the Court.8 " O'Connor
charged the Court with legislating uniformity where Congress had
not found it necessary,8 1 calling the Court's uniformity "half-baked"
in that it limited state creativity and created new problems of
asymmetry."2
IV.

UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING Wilson

The Wilson decision was intended to correct long-standing confusion, unpredictability, and the misdirection of judicial resources
exemplified in the widely divergent approaches to the Section 1983
limitation issue. 8 The Court was apparently content to address the
confusion around this issue by mandating a uniform approach
through Section 1988 rather than by judicial endorsement of a specific limitation period,84 thus leaving some selection processes to the
lower courts. All federal courts are now expressly limited to referring
to "personal injury" statutes of limitation, and implicitly to case law
concerning the application of such statutes.
There is sound logic to the Court's decision to reach a uniform
characterization of Section 1983 suits according to federal law. The
confusion that existed in the limitation selection process prior to
Wilson will be significantly reduced. Courts no longer have the discretion to vacillate on a case-by-case basis, depending upon what
facts dominate the claim. Nor is the "rights under statute" approach, a method that the Reconstructionist Congress probably
never envisioned, 8 any longer applicable. Indeed, the historic
"rights-under-statute versus factual analogy" dichotomy has been
effectively silenced. Justice Stevens conceded that no analogy to a
79. Id. at 1951.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1952-53.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 32-62.
84. The Supreme Court has the power to break new ground in declaring or
adopting statutes of limitations for federal causes of action. Indeed, the Court in Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977), declared that enforcement suits
under Title VII, a statute without a limitation period, were best served by being subject to no statute of limitation. Id. at 366. See Holkeboer, A Call for Uniformity:
Statutes of Limitation in Federal Civil Rights Actions, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 61 (1979).
The Court, however, may have been reluctant to impose a limitation period in light of
the failure of several recent attempts to legislate one. See, e.g., S.436, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985); S.1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 12874, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976). Rather than imposing a limitation period, therefore, the Wilson Court effectively limited federal court discretion to borrow statutes of limitation under Section

1988.
85.

See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
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particular common-law cause of action could be perfect."6 But, he
correctly stated that most of the wrongs the Civil Rights Act contemplates "plainly [sound] in tort. 8 7 Of all the various common-law
actions available, only the personal injury analogy can potentially
encompass offenses that range from physical beatings to interference
with contracts.
The inconsistency associated with the previous selection process
was unfair to both plaintiffs and defendants.88 Contrary to Justice
O'Connor's assertions, the majority did not negate the state's expertise in establishing limitation periods. Rather, the Court limited the
extent to which "state expertise" could be allowed to modify the
character of federal law. Though, as Justice O'Connor stated, uniformity under Wilson is limited,89 the conflicts and inconsistencies
in prior civil rights limitation law contradict her claim that courts
were effective in their use of Section 1988 to select limitations.
Several Illinois federal district courts have had to calculate the
effect of Wilson upon Section 1983 claims. Prior to Wilson, the
Beard decision gave Illinois plaintiffs five years from the time of accrual to file their claims.' 0 On the surface, Wilson mandates a shift
from the five-year catch-all statute that Beard selected to the Illinois two-year, personal injury limitation. Which statute actually applies, and whether Wilson applies retroactively, are the two most
significant issues that post-Wilson Illinois federal courts have faced.
The consensus view is that Wilson will not be applied retroactively to bar unfiled claims. This decision is based on the reasoning
of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson"l in which the Court established a test
to determine when a decision changing the law may be applied retroactively to a particular plaintiff."s More important, however, is a
86. Justice O'Connor's most valid criticism is her attack upon the Court's interpretation that personal injury law is the best approximation of the intent of the 42nd
Congress. See supra text accompanying note 82. It is equally logical that a Congress
dedicated to the reconstruction of a free society, unaware of the novel and insidious
ways our complex times provide for the denial of civil rights, would have approved of
the application of catch-all limitations whenever necessary to provide the broadest
possible protection under Section 1983.

87. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 277.
88. On a human level, uncertainty is costly to all parties. Plaintiffs may be
denied their just remedies if they delay in filing their claims, having wrongly
postulated that the courts would apply a longer statute. Defendants cannot
calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing with confidence when their

delicts lie in repose.
Id. at 1947 n.34.

89. "Even though this approach [will] not bring national uniformity, there [will]

at least be uniformity within each state." NAHMOD II, supra note 20 at 216.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
91. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).

92. The Chevron factors are (1) the extent to which a decision establishes a new
principle of law; (2) the merits in each case and whether, given prior history, purpose,
and effect of the rule in question, retroactive application of the rule would further or
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line of nineteenth-century cases in which the Court affirmed a
state's power to affect unfiled claims by shortening a limitation period.98 In each case, the power was conditioned upon giving the parties a reasonable time "for the commencement of an [unfiled] action
before the bar takes effect." 9' This approach is also recognized in
Illinois law. 98
While there is agreement on the non-retroactivity of Wilson in
Illinois, the federal courts are divided on the issue of which limitation to apply. As long as Illinois plaintiffs continue to win on the
non-retroactivity issue, and as long as they continue to file their
claims within a "reasonable" time, the Seventh Circuit is unlikely to
have an opportunity to resolve the conflict over which limitation period to apply. Eventually, however, a post-Wilson plaintiff will appear whose claim is filed more than two years after accrual. At that
point, an appeal will be inevitable and the Seventh Circuit will be
required to determine the effect of Wilson on Illinois precedent. 96
Of the Illinois federal district courts to consider the limitation
issue, several have applied the two-year statute without substantive
discussion.9" One court to apply the two-year statute, however, considered the issue at some length. In Wegrzyn v. Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Services," the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois held that the appropriate time for filing a
Section 1983 claim in Illinois is two years. 9 The court based its decision upon several factors. First, the Wegrzyn court maintained
that Wilson's rejection of the use of catch-all limitation periods
overruled Beard.00 Second, the court referred to the Seventh Circuit's post-Wilson decision in Bailey v. Faulkner,'' in which that
court applied Indiana's personal injury limitation to a Section 1983
retard its operation; and (3) the degree of hardship or injustice plaintiffs would suffer
under retroactive application of the new rule. Id. at 106-07.
93. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632-33 (1877); see also Wheeler v. Jackson,
137 U.S. 245 (1890); Kosh Konong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668 (1881); Sohn v. Waterson,
84 U.S. 596 (1873); Webster v. Cooper, 55 U.S. 488 (1852).
94. Koshkoning, 104 U.S. at 675.
95. In Nergenah v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 81 Ill.
App. 3d 866, 401 N.E.2d
1154 (1980), the appellate court allowed plaintiff to proceed with a loss-of-consortium
claim, finding a delay of over seven months after the technical bar of the suit by a
shortened limitation period to be a reasonable delay. See also Anderson v. Wagner,
61 Ill.
App. 3d 822, 378 N.E.2d 805 (1978) (eight month delay reasonable).
96. The Seventh Circuit recently held that Wilson mandates the application of
the Indiana personal injury limitation. Bailey v. Faulkner, 765 F.2d 102 (7th Cir.
1985).
97. See Moore v. Floro, 614 F. Supp. 328, 330 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1985); West v.
County of Will, No. 84 C 7540, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1985); Winston v.
Sanders, 610 F. Supp. 176, 177 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
98. 627 F. Supp. 636 (C.D. Ill.
1986).
99. Id. at 640.
100. Id.
101. 765 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1985).
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claim. The court quoted from several points in the Wilson opinion,
citing Justice Stevens' frequent use of the term "personal injury"
and related language.lo0

Before Wegrzyn, however, two Northern District cases, Shorters
v. City of Chicago °s and Johnson v. Arnos,' 4 held that the five-year
limitation period survived Wilson in Illinois. In the better reasoned
of the two cases, Shorters, the court examined the manner in which
the statutes at issue have historically been applied. The court concluded that, in spite of the Court's mandate to use "personal injury"
statutes of limitation, the five-year catch-all statute was more consistent with the purposes and policies of Section 1983 than with the
two-year, personal injury statute. Understanding the Shorters
court's reasoning requires examining the relationships among Beard,
Wilson, and Wilson's companion case, Mismash v. Murray City.'0 5
V.

ISOLATING THE

Wilson

POLICIES AND PROTECTIONS

The language of Wilson is frequently too general to be useful. It
is therefore best to begin by identifying what propositions Wilson
does not represent. This analysis begins with the Beard case. Wilson
repudiates the fundamental assumptions of the Beard court. In
characterizing the claim under Section 1983, the Beard court first
referred to state law and found no comparable action. The Beard
court next examined the available limitations and selected the
"rights-under-statute" analogy as the most applicable. Because
there is no specific Illinois limitation to apply to such claims, Beard
selected the catch-all limitation by default. 06
The Wilson court, on the other hand, looked first to the principles of federal law, then characterized civil rights claims as analogous to personal injury actions,"0 7 a comparison Beard expressly rejected. 08 In contrast, Wilson rejected the practice of selecting a
catch-all limitation period simply because no other period applied to
a court's characterization. Therefore, if the five-year limitation is to
survive Wilson, it must do so under reasoning other than that which
Beard provided.
Both Mismash and the lower court opinion in Garcia v. Wilson
provide the needed support for the five-year statute. 0 9 The Tenth
Circuit decided these cases on the same day and both were peti102. Wegrzyn, 627 F. Supp. at 639.
103. 617 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
104. 624 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
105. 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2111 (1985).
106. Beard, 731 F.2d at 338.
107. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268-71.
108. See supra text accompanying note 60.

109. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1984).
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tioned for certiorari; but, certiorari was granted only to Garcia.

Comparing the cases and the Tenth Circuit's treatment of each is
illustrative of the policies Wilson seeks to protect.
The factual similarity of the cases is striking. The Mismash suit
also arose from the alleged severe beating of the plaintiff by arresting officers."' However, as Justice O'Connor observed,"" the Tenth
Circuit appears to have reached contradictory results. Reconciling
the cases is necessary for understanding civil rights limitation policy
as the Wilson court has expressed it.
In Garcia, the Tenth Circuit explicitly referred to a Section
1983 claim as "an action for injury to personal rights.""' 2 That court
applied the New Mexico statute of limitation that controlled suits
over injuries to the person or to reputation."' It rejected a limitation period contained in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act" 14 and a
catch-all statute previously held by a state court to be inapplicable
to personal injuries." 6 Therefore, the only limitation period under
New Mexico law that was broad enough to encompass injuries to the
rights of others, or personal rights, was the limitation applying to a
suit for "an injury to [persons] or to [their] reputation. '"" 6
The Mismash case arose in Utah and addressed the same limitation issue in virtually the same fact context as did the Garcia
opinion. Consistent with its Garcia opinion, the Tenth Circuit in
Mismash noted in a terse discussion that Section 1983 claims
"should be characterized as actions for injuries to the rights of
others."' The court rejected a Utah limitation governing "actions
for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction.""" The court called these "personal torts" and held that the
longer, catch-all statute" was to be used in Section 1983 suits. The
rejection of a catch-all limitation, combined with the approval of a
catch-all over a "personal tort" limitation in another case seems inconsistent. 20 However, examination of past state court interpreta110. Mismash, 730 F.2d at 1366.
111. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112. Wilson, 731 F.2d at 651.
113. Id.
114. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15(A) (1978).
115. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978) was held inapplicable to personal injury

actions in Chavez v. Kitsch, 70 N.M. 439, 374 P.2d 497 (1969).
116. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1978).
117.

Mismash, 730 F.2d at 1362 (emphasis added).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29 (1953) (emphasis added).
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 28-12-25 (2) (1953).
118.

120. In Justice O'Connor's dissent, she indicated a number of apparently "inconsistent" cases that the Tenth Circuit decided on the same day as it decided Wilson. Included in these are Mismash and two other cases, Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, Kansas, 730 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1984) and McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d
1367 (10th Cir. 1984). See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The
Colorado case which Justice O'Connor indicated, McKay, rejected COLO. REV. STAT. §
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tions of the Utah statutes showed that the catch-all statute was the
only one broad enough to apply to Section 1983 claims, if regarded
as suits based on injuries to the rights of others. 2'
The situation in Illinois is similar to that in Utah. Illinois courts
have interpreted the two-year Illinois statute that expressly applies
to "personal injuries" to be applicable only to direct, physical injuries. Shorters'22 and Johnson12s both pointed this out. This narrow
interpretation, though consistently followed by Illinois courts,1 24
cannot give full effect to the protection of Section 1983 as Wilson
and other civil rights cases have interpreted it. On the other hand,
the applicability of the five-year limitation period to such a wide
range of injuries and claims provides an approach consistent with an
interpretation of civil rights suits as arising from offenses to personal rights. The five-year period, for example, has been applied to
suits for unpaid city relief for the blind, 28 negligence resulting in
non-physical injury, 2 wrongful dissolution of a corporation,127 and
to numerous other cases best described as suits for injuries to the
personal rights of others. 28 Such actions are clearly more similar to
the deprivation of personal rights in modern society than is a statute
interpreted to apply under the narrow situation of direct, physical
personal injury.
In many states like Illinois, selecting the correct statute of limi13-80-102 (1973) (applying to actions for false imprisonment) and CoLo. REv. STAT. §
13-80-106 (1973) (applying to actions for liability that federal statutes create). Instead, it adopted the residuary limitation. Id. § 13-80-108(1)(b). McKay underscores
the point of the Garcia/Mismashanalysis: where a court is faced with statutes of
limitation inapplicable to a personal rights suit under Section 1983, it is proper, even
under Wilson, to select a residuary limitation statute. McKay, 730 F.2d at 1369-70.
121. This statute has been held to apply to negligence suits. See Matheson v.
Pearson, 619 P.2d 321 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1980); Hansen v. Petrof Trading Co., 527 P.2d
116 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1974); nuisances, 68 Utah 309, 249 P.2d 1036 (1972) (predecessor
statute); a suit versus a third party for personal injuries received in the course of
employment, Salt Lake City v. Industrial Comm., 81 Utah 213, 17 P.2d 239 (1932)
(predecessor statute); as well as to "tort actions not otherwise provided for," O'Neill
v. San Pedro, 38 Utah 475, 114 P. 127.
122. Shorters, 617 F. Supp. at 665.
123. Johnson, 624 F. Supp. at 1071.
124. See, e.g., Mitchell v. White Motor Co., 58 Ill. 2d 159, 317 N.E.2d 505
(1974); Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); Bassett v. Bassett,
20 Ill. App. 543 (1886).
125. Lyons v. Morgan County, 313 Ill. App. 296, 40 N.E.2d 103 (1942).
126. Society of Mount Carmel v. Fox, 90 Ill. App. 537, 413 N.E.2d 480 (1980).
127. Krauter v. Adler, 328 Ill. App. 127, 65 N.E.2d 215 (1946).
128. Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975) (tortious
interference with plaintiff's business through false and defamatory statements); Henon v. Lever Bros. Co., 144 Ill. App. 3d 608, 449 N.E.2d 196 (1983) (compensation for
wrongful discharge from employment); Loughran v. A & M Moving & Storage Co., 17
I11. App. 3d 119, 307 N.E.2d 794 (1974) (damages to personal property); In re
Franke's Estate, 124 Ill. App. 2d 24, 259 N.E.2d 754 (1970) (recovery of balances due
for services rendered by an employee); Schlossen v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 299 Ill.
77, 132 N.E. 291 (1921) (permanent injury to realty).
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tation will pose some problems even under the Wilson guidelines. 2

9

This is true because the Wilson definition of "personal injury" is too
broad to be meaningful. The Court could, of course, have been more
specific in defining personal injury, or could even have imposed a
standard limitation period upon all Section 1983 suits. 30 The absence of specificity is the basis for the imperfections in Wilson's uni-

formity. Still, even some uniformity is an improvement over the confusion of the past. Indeed, perfect uniformity has never been a high
priority of the Court in its civil rights decisions. " ' It is just as possi-

ble that the Court, openly concerned about the overburdened federal system, sought to reduce the flow of legal resources in a direction that will never produce concrete answers.

Whatever the Court's motives, lower courts are now left to sort
out the Wilson policies and apply them correctly. In Illinois, and
possibly in other states, dogmatic application of a particular statute,

simply because it is labeled one for "personal injuries," would be
contrary to the very policies Wilson seeks to protect. The difficulty
of applying Wilson will be reduced if Wilson is regarded as establishing a system of sorting possible limitation periods in the context

of a personal injury categorization. Given the proposition that state
statutes of limitation are controlling in Section 1983 suits, a court
searching for the appropriate statute must look first for statutes
controlling actions based upon the infringement of personal rights.
The guiding principle at this stage in evaluating the potential
129. One possible way for states to end the confusion is to enact statutes of
limitation more specifically directed to the "personal rights" scheme that the cases
discussed in this article established. There is also the possibility of amending existing
residuary statutes to make them more clearly applicable in Section 1983 suits where
there is no other clear choice. Another device for simplification may be the enactment
of a specific statute of limitation to apply to Section 1983 claims brought in that
state. This would present a difficult, but not impossible, problem in drafting. States
have, on occasion, enacted limitations on federal claims that federal courts have upheld. See, e.g., NEs. REV. STAT. § 25-219 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (Supp.
1975). The statute that was rejected in McKay, 730 F.2d at 1369-70, COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-80-106 (1973), applies to all federal causes of action that do not provide limitations. Its application was declared unconstitutional in Wolf Sales Co. v. Rudolph
Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D. Colo. 1952), an action under the Sherman and
Clayton acts. But, Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D. Colo. 1966) upheld its application to a Section 1983 claim (a result McKay obviously overruled). It is unclear
whether Wilson made enactment of a state limitation for Section 1983 suits impossible. A state statute defining an action consistently with the federal characterization,
and not discriminating against the federal action, would cure the irregularities that
appear to concern the Court. See Brophy, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Rights
Litigation, 1976 ARiz. ST. L.J. 99, 133-39 (1976).
130. See supra note 84.
131. "Congress has provided direction, indicating that state law will often provide the content of the federal remedial rule. This statutory reliance on state law
obviously means that there will not be nationwide uniformity on these issues." Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 593-94 n.11 (1978). See also Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); Biehler, supra note 37 at 15-16.
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limitation period should be the federal court's application of state
law and the state court's construction of the statute. Where no statute is applicable, either expressly or by historic construction, to personal rights, selection of a catch-all statute would be appropriate depending upon the manner in which the statute has been applied.
Where more than one statute is applicable, policy favors selection of
the statute most generous to plaintiffs. " 2
The soundness of this approach is underscored by comparing
the Wegrzyn and Shorters opinions. Wegrzyn's rationale for the
two-year statute is weak. It simply imposes a reactive, narrow "personal injury" label to the cause of action. For example, Wegrzyn's
reliance on Bailey is misplaced, because that case solely and specifically involved Indiana law.1 33 Second, Shorter's catalogue of Wil-4
3
son's broader language discussing a range of "personal rights'

countered Wegrzyn's reliance on the Wilson Court's frequent use of
"personal injury" terminology. 135 Additionally, Wegrzyn incorrectly
assumed that the Court's rejection of the New Mexico catch-all statute meant that no catch-all could ever be appropriate in a Section
1983 suit.8 6 There is no logical basis for such a broad conclusion.
132. The nature of a Section 1983 claim, if nothing else, is enough to mandate
this policy. See supra note 52 (Justice Harlan's remarks quoted from Monroe v.
Pope). Generally, where more than one limitation may apply, courts will select the
longer of the two. See Marshall v. Kleppe, 637 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 1980); Shah
v. Halliburton Co., 627 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 1980); Reid v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 512 F.2d 1294, 1297 (6th Cir. 1975); Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039,
1042 (8th Cir. 1931).
133. See supra text accompanying note 102.
134. Shorters, 617 F. Supp. at 663-65.
135. See supra text accompanying note 103.
136. See supra text accompanying note 101. The proposition that Wilson
stands for the inapplicability of all catch-all limitations was unequivocally rejected in
Greenfield v. District of Columbia, 623 F. Supp. 47 (D.C. 1985). The Greenfield court
identified a situation similar to that in Illinois and Utah in that no specific limitation
period was applicable to all personal injury actions. Id. at 50. Trying to select a single
limitation period, then, would "do exactly what the Wilson Court was trying to prevent - to pick and choose from among the various state causes of action the one that
most closely resembles the particular Section 1983 action in question." Id. That court
also criticized the Fifth Circuit for its reliance on the concept of "intentionality" in
selecting a limitation period. See Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985). Gates
reasoned that, since "[mlost 1983 actions are predicated in intentional rather than
negligent acts," the Wilson rule mandated a one-year limitation on intentional torts.
This simplistic dichotomy between intent and negligence may be easy to apply, but
its focus is far too narrow for the range of acts and rights that arise in Section 1983
suits. It is particularly inappropriate because the Supreme Court has held that negligence is sufficient to trigger a Section 1983 claim. See Parratt v. Taylor, 100 U.S. 1
(1980). Use of an intent/negligence test was recently rejected for civil rights claims
arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982) in Hobson v. Brennan, 625 F. Supp. 459
(D.D.C. 1985) because of its extreme narrowness. Moreover, even where intentional
torts are the basis for a Section 1983 claim, plaintiffs are still required to prove that
the act was one "under color of state law" depriving them of rights "secured under
the Constitution." Id. This burden of proof beyond the mere elements of the tort
surely entitles the plaintiff to more time to prepare a case.
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The court's reliance on Wilson's criticism of the Beard-type rationale confuses the rejection of a line of reasoning with the rejection of
a particular result. Most importantly, Wegrzyn criticizes Shorters
for placing "too much emphasis upon the state's own characterization of what is meant by 'injury to the person.'13 7 This criticism,
however, flies in the face of the Court's own mandate "to select, in
each state, the one most appropriate statute of limitations for all
Section 1983 claims." ss Under this Court directive, few statutes
could be less appropriate to a Section 1983 "personal injury" claim
than is the Illinois "personal injury" limitation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court, in Wilson, corrected long-standing confusion in limitation periods for suits arising under Section 1983. Wilson has brought some uniformity to the process of selection of limitation periods in individual states. The Court also capped the flow
of legal resources in this direction by overruling those cases in which
courts focused on specific facts to draw an analogy to misconduct
identified in state common or statutory law.
The characterization of civil rights suits as analogous to personal injury actions is imperfect, as would be any broad characterization of such a complicated remedy. Whether another characterization would be more logical is doubtful. Nevertheless, the Civil
Rights Act is a federal remedy and should be so characterized.
The most important issue facing courts in the post-Wilson era
remains selecting the appropriate limitation period. The manner in
which courts have interpreted potential limitation periods is of great
significance, particularly in searching for the statute applicable to
the protection of personal rights. In Illinois, this means that the correct limitation period to apply is the five-year statute, rather than
the two-year "personal injury" limitation mandated by that a superficial reading of Wilson.

137.
138.

Wegrzyn, 627 F. Supp. at 640.
Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275. Wegrzyn also overlooked a crucial point in its

conclusion regarding deference to state law. Key to the Mismash decision to reject a

"personal injury" limitation was a state court decision, Chavez v. Kitsch, 70 N.M.
439, 374 P.2d 497 (1969), declaring a New Mexico limitation, similar in scope to the
Illinois personal injury limitation, inapplicable to personal injury actions. While the
denial of certiorari has no precedential value, there is a strong inference that the
Court approved of the Tenth Circuit's treatment of Mismash. This inference arises

from the factual similarities of the cases and the nature of the statutes involved. The
Tenth Circuit's preference in Garcia for a "personal injury" statute over a catch-all
statute compared to an opposite result in Mismash leads to the conclusion that the
Tenth Circuit, with the apparent approval of the Supreme Court, engaged in precisely the kind of state law analysis Wegrzyn rejected. See supra text accompanying

notes 111-21.

